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ABSTRACT
Relation-Based Access Control (RelBAC ) is an access con-
trol model for the Web scenarios, which represents permis-
sions as relations between users and objects. It allows to ex-
press policies using cardinality and quantifiers and to specify
separation of duties in the basic model rather than as an ad-
ditional constraint. This paper shows that by exploiting the
formalization of RelBAC model in Description Logics (DL),
sophisticated access control policies can be directly encoded
as DL formulas. This facilitates the administration with
design-time reasoning on hierarchies, propagations, separa-
tion of duties, etc. and helps with run-time reasoning to
make access control decisions. All these reasonings can be
automated and performed through state of the art, off-the-
shelf DL reasoners.
General Terms
Access Control
Keywords
RelBAC , access control policies, design-time reasoning, run-
time reasoning
1. INTRODUCTION
Many new Web applications such as Online Social Networks,
Blogs, Shared Desktops and more traditional applications
re-developed as Web-based services allow users to store, edit,
share their data over Internet. The Web can potentially in-
crease the number and the quality of user interactions with
other users as a result of having a large community of con-
nected users and shared data. Many of these interactions
may span across several different organizations. They can
be one-off, short term or long term interactions. They may
involve individual, groups, communities and combinations
of these.
Many existing Web-based services however fail to offer a
flexible and fine-grained protection. In many cases, sharing
is all-or-nothing while users need support to at least match
those security policies they can implement on traditional
desktop applications. The complexity of such scenarios re-
quires tools to support the owner of such data in specifying
the access control rules and complex reasoning about poli-
cies, while the system is in operation.
RelBAC (Relation Based Access Control) is a new access
control model and a logic proposed by Giunchiglia et al. in
[11] that can offer such a support. The key idea, which differ-
entiates the RelBAC model from the state of the art, is that
permissions are modeled as relations between users (called
subjects in access control terminology) and data (also called
objects) while permission assignments are their instantia-
tions, with arity, on specific sets of users and data. The Rel-
BAC model is defined as an Entity Relationship (ER) model
[6] thus defining permissions as relations between classes of
subjects and classes of objects. This paper completes the
model by describing its reasoning ability both at design-time
and at run-time.
By exploiting the well known translation of ER diagrams
into Description Logics (DL)1 [2], we define a (Description)
logic, called the RelBAC Logic, which allows us to express
and reason about subjects, objects and permissions. In turn,
this allows us to reason about policies by using state of the
art, off-the-shelf, DL Reasoners, e.g., Pellet[19].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
briefly introduces the RelBAC model with a motivating ex-
ample. Design-time and run-time reasoning with RelBAC
are shown in Section 3 and Section 4. Section 5 shows the
architecture of a RelBAC system integrated with a DL rea-
soner and some test results. Section 6 summaries related
work and we conclude in Section 7.
2. RELBAC
In this section, we describe briefly the model and the logic
of RelBAC via a motivating example from web based sales
force automation (SFA).
2.1 Motivating Example
An SFA application is typically a client-server application
that provides a set of tools and services such as e-mail, re-
porting, database of contacts, a more or less complex docu-
ment management system, to support salesmen in their pre-
sale (i.e. preparing the offer) and post-sale (i.e. scouting
1A decidable sub-set of First Order Logic (FOL).
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for follow up contracts) activities. Most small and medium
companies cannot afford to run their own server, so many
vendors offer it also as a service, accessible by mean of a
Web-based client. To be useful the service must offer to
the management of the company a flexible and fine-grained
access control able to map responsibilities and operations
for the company’s sales force. At the same time, each sales-
man, typically paid on bonuses, is quite protective about her
own contacts and negotiations, so she should be able to in-
dicate further security constraints to protect her own data.
At the same time, any non trivial contract acquisition re-
quires collaborations among salesmen and also support from
the technical department to have any chance of success, so
there should be also the possibility to specify temporary and
dynamic access control policies.
In the above scenario we assume the following policies:
1. An agent can create at most one customer folder per
sector.
2. At most 2 agents and a manager can be involved in
a new offer provided they are not involved already in
more than 3 other offers.
3. At least 2 agents should be involved in a sector.
4. Any agent cannot read more than 3 customer folders
belonging to at most 2 different industrial sectors.
5. At least one agent with experience in Industrial Sector
ICT must be involved in Offer Information Highways.
2.2 Why RelBAC?
RelBAC allows to model and express access control policies
and the related properties (e.g. separation of duty) simpler
than with other existing AC models. In particular
• RelBAC supports cardinality. Quantifiers have been
very successfully used in data bases, but in access con-
trol often policies are implicitly universally quantified.
They are useful since using them we can express, for
example, access control rules which states that stu-
dents should be able to use at least one PC. We are
stating that any student in principle could use all PCs
but that what really matters is that she has access to
one. And the above policy could be made stronger,
using number restrictions, by saying that a student
should have access to exactly one PC or, using the uni-
versal quantifier, by saying that students can use only
PCs and that therefore, e.g., they cannot use personal
assistants. Of course the same effect can be obtained
in the existing models, e.g., RBAC, by checking these
as constraints at run time.
• Using cardinality, important properties such Separa-
tion of Duty as defined by Li et al. [], can be easily
expressed as an access control rule and reason about it
(as shown in Section 3.4) rather than as an additional
contraints to the basic model as in RBAC.
• RelBAC splits subjects from objects by defining per-
missions as relations. The role of users and objects is
completely symmetric and one can symmetrically de-
fine user-centric (i.e all senior managers can write file
F) or object-centric policies (i.e. File F can be read
only by senior managers).
2.3 The RelBACModel and Logic
As is shown by the ER Diagram in Figure 1, What distin-
guishes RelBAC from other access control models is PER-
MISSION in addition to the basic components such as SUB-
JECT and OBJECT. The intuition is that a PERMISSION is an
operation that users (SUBJECTs) can perform on certain re-
sources (OBJECTs). To capture this intuition a PERMISSION
is named with the name of the operation it refers to, e.g.,
Write, and Read operation or some more high-level opera-
tion, e.g., Assign or Manage. In RelBAC , the original form
of a verb is used as a PERMISSION name with the first let-
ter capitalized. The generalization (loops) on each com-
Figure 1: The ER Diagram of the RelBAC Model.
ponents represent IS-A relations. They are the most com-
mon and important relations among the knowledge. Groups
of SUBJECT and classes of OBJECT2 are organized with IS-
A hierarchies. This is coherent to the tradition how peo-
ple organize their desktop resources: a top-down tree-like
file system. The most interesting part is the loop on PER-
MISSION which represents the IS-A relations among named
pairs, e.g., Update(ann, doc). Regarding a PERMISSION as a
set of named pairs allows set theories exploited on PERMIS-
SIONs. For example, ‘Update is more powerful than Read’
can be captured with the intuition that those people who
can access some data with the permission ‘Update’ should
have already been assigned the permission ‘Read’, which is
represented as ‘each subject-object pair named Update IS-A
pair named with Read’. A IS-A relation can be represented
as a subsumption axiom in RelBAC as
C v D or P v Q
where C and D are both groups or classes, and P and Q are
both PERMISSIONs.
In RelBAC , a PERMISSION assignment associates a PERMIS-
SION to a specific set of (SUBJECT, OBJECT) pair(s) in the
following forms of logic formulas.
U v ∃P.O (1)
U v ∀P.O (2)
U v≥ n P.O (3)
U v≤ n P.O (4)
U v ∀¬P.¬O (5)
P (u, o) (6)
RelBAC is specially strong in representing cardinality in
PERMISSION assignments. Formula 1 associates to PERMIS-
SION P with the set of pairs formed with each individual
of group U and some (at least 1, maybe more) instances
in class O. Accordingly, Formulas 2-5 associate to P with
2Referred as group and class for short in the rest of the
paper.
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Figure 2: Subjects and Objects of an SFA Scenario.
Figure 3: Permissions of an SFA Scenario.
the set of pairs formed with each individual of U and only,
minimum n, maximum n and all objects in O. As for in-
dividuals, Formula 6 associates the pair (u, o) to P . The
‘set ’ constructor ‘{·}’ represents a set of individuals such as
{u}. It is used to associate PERMISSION P with individuals
such as {u} v ∃P.O with respect to Formula 1. Moreover,
RelBAC can specify a PERMISSION assignment from the OB-
JECT perspective. By exchanging the places of U and O and
replace P with its inversion P−, Formula 1’-6’ are specified,
e.g., Formula 4’ is O v≤ n P−.U , which specifies that ‘each
object in O can be access with P by maximum n subjects
from U ’.
Now we show how to apply RelBAC to the motivating ex-
ample. Figure 2 models the subjects and objects hierarchies
in which IS-A relation is modeled as generalization in con-
trast to other relations such as ‘ResponsibleFor’ and ‘Com-
posedOf’. Figure 3 shows the relations among PERMISSIONs.
With the formulas described above, the policies of in the mo-
tivating example can be written as the following PERMISSION
assignments:
1. Agent v≤ 1Create.(Customeru ≤ 1Compose.Sector)
2. Offer v≤ 2Involve.Agentunionsq ≤ 1Involve.Manager,
Employee v≤ 3Involve−.Offer
3. Sector v≥ 2Involve.Agent
4. Agent v≤ 3Involve−.(Customeru ≤ 2Compose.Sector
5. {infoHighway} v≥ 1Involve.(AgentuInvolve−.ICT )
3. DESIGN-TIME REASONING
The benefit of expressing policies and security properties
using RelBAC is the ability to reason about them. We can
identify two phases of reasoning in RelBAC . At design-time,
reasoning supports policy writers to detect possible redun-
dancy and conflicts or to verify if the set of policies satisfy
a desired static security property (i.e. separation of duties).
The run-time reasoning abilities of RelBAC can be used to
make access control decisions (coming in Section 4).
In RelBAC , the knowledge can be classified into two cate-
gories: policy and state. The knowledge dealing with do-
main terminologies of the access control model is called P
(for Policy) such as the names of groups, classes, hierarchies,
etc. The rest that relates to individuals is called S (for State)
such as membership of a user to a group, an assignment to
a individual user and/or object, etc. P is rather stable after
design, while S is quite dynamic since it is sensitive to the
system changes.
3.1 Hierarchy
Different relations between knowledge can form various hi-
erarchies, even graphs such as shown in Figure 2. A feature
of RelBAC is its natural formalization of the IS-A relation.
For example, in Figure 2(b), the classification of offers into
subsets Processed, ToDo and Urgent shows a hierarchy of
IS-A relations among objects. Other relations such as re-
sponsible for or composed of can be formalized directly as
binary relations. There are many practical constraints in
hierarchy management and here we refer to group hierar-
chy as example and the theory applies also to hierarchies of
OBJECT and PERMISSION. Two of the important constraints
are considered to show the reasoning power of RelBAC for
hierarchy management.
Constraint 1: ‘A group should not be declared directly or
indirectly as a sub-group of itself.’
The representation of IS-A relation as subsumption axiom
preserves the anti-symmetry property of the partial order.
RelBAC provides subsumption check as follows.
P |= C v D?
For group hierarchy, given two groups U1 and U2, RelBAC
checks whether the knowledge base infers that U1 is sub-
sumed by U2 with the reasoning as ‘P |= U1 v U2?’. A
‘Yes’ answer restricts U2 v U1 to be added to P. For ex-
ample, ‘a manager is also an employee’ can be formalized
as ‘Manager v Employee’ and if the administrator asserts
by mistake that ‘an employee is also a manager’, a check of
‘P,S |= Manager v Employee?’ is processed and help to
avoid such mistakes.
Constraint 2: ‘A group should not be declared as the subset
of two sets that are mutually exclusive.’
In RelBAC , mutually exclusiveness of two groups is repre-
sented as follows.
C uD v ⊥
Thus, the constraint is enforced in RelBAC with the follow-
ing theorem.
{U1 u U2 v ⊥, U v U1, U v U2} |= U v ⊥
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For example, Manager u Agent v ⊥ formalizes that ‘Man-
ager and Agent are mutually exclusive’. Then any attempt
to assign a user to both groups can be avoided as it conflicts
to existing knowledge base. This constraint is also useful in
Section 3.4 when we discuss the property of Separation of
Duties.
Notice that not all paths in the hierarchies imply inheri-
tance. We just model those inheritable with partial order
and formalize them into subsumption formulas. Here we
talked about IS-A hierarchy of SUBJECT only, but these con-
straints are also valid for OBJECT and PERMISSION with sim-
ilar reasoning.
3.2 Membership
Employees of our SFA scenario are grouped as director, man-
ager, etc. Similar to what RBAC does with roles, RelBAC
provides an access control mechanism based on membership
of groups such as to grant that ‘managers can read offers’.
With the growing size and number of the groups, the man-
agement of user membership becomes crucial. The RelBAC
logic can help the administrator to control these member-
ships.
Adding (deleting) an individual user from an existing group
means only adding (deleting) an assertion to (from) the
knowledge base S. For example, to add a user u as a man-
ager, we can just add to S one assertion Manager(u). This
will give u all the permissions assigned to Manager just as
the assignment of a role in RBAC. However, before adding
this state assertion to S, the administrator must check the
following two properties:
Redundancy An assertion is redundant if it can be inferred
from the existing knowledge base already. To check that u
is a member of Ui is the entailment reasoning as follows:
P,S |= Ui(u)?
A ‘Yes’ answer means that this membership is not necessary
because the knowledge base implies it already. This can
happen in two cases. Either Ui(u) exists already in S or u
inherits the membership through group hierarchies.
Conflict If the knowledge base is consistent, but after adding
the assertion it is no longer consistent any more, the asser-
tion is conflicting with the knowledge base. To check conflict
is the consistency reasoning as follows:
P,S |= ⊥?
Conflicts are checked on the updated knowledge base S ′
which is S ∪ {Ui(u)}. A ‘No’ answer means that the up-
dated knowledge base is still consistent and the operation to
add the membership of u to Ui can be performed.
Referring to our example, adding Hill to the group of man-
ager is equivalent to adding the assertion ‘Hill is a manager’
to S. This is achieved by following steps.
1. Redundancy checking with P,S |= Manager(hill)? if
‘Yes’, the assertion is redundant so no need to add it into
the knowledge base.
2. Conflict checking with P,S |= ¬Manager(hill)? if ‘Yes’,
the knowledge base implies that ‘Hill is not a manager’ and
Figure 4: Delete Membership in Hierarchy.
the assertion should not be added.
3. If the operation is neither redundant nor conflicting, add
to the knowledge base Manager(hill).
When adding a user u as a member of a group Ui in a group
hierarchy of partial order, we can do the same as without
the hierarchy because the ‘IS-A’ relation does not bring ex-
ceptions for the redundancy and conflict checking. Deleting
a user u from Ui, is more complicated considering that it
might have impact on the membership of u to other groups
in the hierarchy. In order to get the most specific group the
user u belongs to, a form of realization reasoning is used to
find the most specific concept Ui in the given concept set
{U1, ..., Un}, such that P,S |= Ui(u).
The following steps should be followed in order to delete a
user membership in a group hierarchy.
1. Entailment checking P,S |= Ui(u)? A ‘No’ answer means
that u is not a member of Ui and nothing else need to be
done; otherwise go to Step 2.
2. Realization checking for the most specific group Uj u
belongs and subsumption checking such that Uj satisfies
Uj ≥ Ui (Uj can be exactly Ui).
3. Subsumption checking for all Uk such that Uj ≥ Uk and
entailment checking such that Uk(u) can be implied by the
knowledge base.
4. Delete Uj(u), and for all k add to knowledge base Uk(u)
after entailment checking for redundancy and conflict. And
go to Step 1.
As shown in Figure 4(a), the most complex situation is when
membership of u to Ui is propagated from Uj which satisfies
Uj ≥ Ui with some intermediate group U ′j . Thus the deletion
of u from Ui requires the compensation of adding u as mem-
ber of all Uk, U
′
k... till it reaches Ui. As an example, let us as-
sume that in our motivating example there is an extra group
PowerfulAgent that enable members to be both a agent
and a sale manager. So the resulting hierarchy is as Figure
4(b). If the administrator wants to remove this anomaly
and make sure that no agent can be assigned as a manager
then the deletion of membership to Manager requires not
only the removal of assertion PowerfulAgent(john) but the
compensation of adding assertion Agent(john). The process
will consist in compensation to Manager(john) as in step 3
and deletion of this assertion in the next loop.
In this section we discussed only groups membership, how-
ever, object classes and permissions are also sets, with ob-
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jects or (subject, object) pairs as elements, their member-
ship management is then dealt similarly to that of groups.
3.3 Propagation
With the structure of knowledge defined, membership and
access right may propagate through the relations. The nat-
ural formalization of IS-A relation in RelBAC leads to free
propagations through IS-A hierarchies. By free, we mean
that no extra effort is necessary except the specification of
IS-A relations among knowledge. In this section, we will
show how to manage such propagations with the help of
design-time reasoning with RelBAC .
3.3.1 Membership Propagation
The membership of a SUBJECT u to a group U is a system
state represented as ‘U(u)’ in S. Suppose there are two
groups Ui and Uj such that Ui IS-A Uj , and u is a member of
Ui. Then the fact that ‘u is a member of Uj ’ can be inferred
from the knowledge base which means the membership of
u propagates from Ui to Uj . Notice that the transitivity of
‘v’ as a partial order, it is not necessary that Ui and Uj are
directly connected with one IS-A relation in the hierarchy.
For example, if ‘Bob is a member of the group Manager’
and ‘Manager IS-A Employee’, then ‘Bob is a member of
the group Employee’ comes for free as the knowledge base
can infer
{Manager(bob),Manager v Employee} |= Employee(bob)
Similarly, the membership of an OBJECT and a PERMISSION
can propagate through the IS-A hierarchy of OBJECT and
PERMISSION. This feature saves many membership assign-
ments as they can be inferred by the knowledge base by
reasoning.
3.3.2 Permission Propagation
The PERMISSION propagation is more complex than mem-
bership propagation, because in RelBAC a PERMISSION has
three kinds of IS-A hierarchies to propagate i.e. the hierar-
chy of SUBJECT, of OBJECT and of PERMISSION itself.
The IS-A relation of SUBJECT are represented in RelBAC as
subsumption axioms as ‘Ui v Uj ’. By the following reason-
ing
{Uj v Ui, Ui v α} |= Uj v α
in which α stands for a permission assignment in Formula
1-5, a PERMISSION can propagate from a junior group to
a senior group, e.g., Manager ≥ Employee implies that
‘all the permissions assigned to the employees propagate to
managers’.
For propagation through OBJECT hierarchies, given two as-
signments β and β′ with the same permission P , but on
different object classes Oi and Oj , if Oi v Oj the propaga-
tion goes in different directions according to the semantics
of the assignment.
• If β and β′ are P on some / only / at least n objects
in Oi and Oj , then by reasoning as
{Oi v Oj , U v β} |= U v β′
P propagates from Oi to Oj . For example, ‘agents
are allowed to read some / only / at least 3 processed
offers’ implies that ‘agents are allowed to read some
(only, at least 3) offers’ because processed offers are
subset of offers (Processed v Offer).
• If β and β′ are P on all / at most n objects in Oi and
Oj , then by reasoning
{Oi v Oj , U v β′} |= U v β
P propagates from Oj to Oi. For example, ‘employees
are allowed to read all / at most 5 offers’ implies that
‘managers are allowed to read all (at most 5) processed
offers’ because Processed v Offer.
A PERMISSION can propagate through the IS-A hierarchy
of PERMISSION as well. In contrast to sets of individuals
such as groups or classes, the subsumption P v Q describes
the IS-A relation between sets of (u, o) pairs. For example,
Manage v Read implies that any assignment with permis-
sion Manage is also assigned with Read such as ‘those are
allowed to manage offers’ implies that ‘they are also allowed
to read offers’.
Propagations of membership and PERMISSION through the
three IS-A hierarchies are just reasoning result of the knowl-
edge base without any policies regulating for these propa-
gations. This feature will simplify the system design and
reduce the possibility of errors.
3.4 Separation of Duties
RelBAC is very expressive because it models a PERMISSION
as a binary relation between sets of SUBJECT and OBJECT,
which allows the three components evolve relatively inde-
pendently. Here we will show the rich expressiveness of Rel-
BAC on representation of Separation of Duties (SoD) and
furthermore, representation of the high-level constraints on
the composition of the SUBJECTs in which the duties are dis-
tributed.
3.4.1 Separation of Duties
In general, given n duties of a task as d1, ..., dn, an SoD
enforces that at least k(2 ≤ k ≤ n) users should take all
these duties. This means that any user can have at most
m (m = dn/(k− 1)e− 1) of these duties. Thus a single user
should not be allowed to perform any m+ 1 of these duties.
So RelBAC formalizes this SoD as follows.
C
dn/(k−1)e
n G
i=1
(udn/(k−1)ej=1 Pij) v ⊥
in which Pij stands for the jth PERMISSION out of the ith
selected m+ 1 PERMISSIONs.
For example the task to manage an offer consists 3 duties
as to create, to process and to archive the offer. An SoD
enforces that ‘at least 2 employees should be involved in
managing an offer’. Suppose Create, Process and Archive
are 3 permissions with co-domain as Offer, then this SoD
can be represented as a policy as follows.
Create u Process uArchive v ⊥
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As C
dn/(k−1)e
n = C
d3/(2−1)e
3 = C
3
3 = 1, there is only 1 con-
junction of the 3 permissions in the disjunction axiom. The
policy can be represented with mutually exclusive PERMIS-
SIONs, which is more flexible than the mutually exclusive
‘role’s in RBAC [8]. We can easily describe a duty with
PERMISSION directly rather than create ‘role’s for each new
duty.
3.4.2 High Level Constraint of SoD
For a general SoD, the composition of k users chosen to
complete the task is sometimes important. Cardinality con-
cern of the chosen SUBJECTs is a higher level constraint as
the original SoD does nothing about it, e.g., to enforce that
the set of SUBJECTs for the SoD above with the following
composition.
1. Exactly two different users, i.e., one manager and one
agent.
2. One manager and one agent, but the two can be the
same.
3. At least one manager and at least one agent, and maybe
some other managers or agents.
4. At least one manager and one agent, and some other
employees besides managers and agents.
In RelBAC such constraints are written as the following for-
mulas:
1’ Offer v (= 2Manage−.User)u
(= 1Manage−.Manager) u (= 1Manage−.Agent)
2’ Offer v (= 1Manage−.Manager)u(= 1Manage−.Agent)
3’ Offer v (∀Manage−.(Manager unionsqAgent))u
(∃Manage−.Manager) u (∃Manage−.Agent)
4’ Offer v (∃Manage−.Manager)u(∃Manage−.Agent)
Here we abbreviate both ≥ n and ≤ n as = n in standard
DL number restriction. N.Li et al. introduced an algebra
in [16] to specify complex policies combining requirements
on user cardinality. RelBAC can capture all the concerns in
their work with standard description logics.
4. RUN-TIME REASONING
Once we expressed the set of policies that apply to a sys-
tem as a RelBAC knowledge base, run-time reasoning can
be performed for access control decision and dynamic sepa-
ration of duties.
4.1 Access Control Decision
RelBAC the query for some fact γ can be answered by the
following entailment reasoning.
P,S |= γ?
Basically, to decide whether a SUBJECT u has some PERMIS-
SION P on some OBJECT o, RelBAC queries γ = P (u, o)
to the knowledge base. If P (u, o) is entailed, the decision
should be ‘Yes’; otherwise, ‘No’. In addition to this, RelBAC
is able to take decisions on many complex access requests for
each kind of permission assignment discussed in Section 2.3.
Here user u belongs to a group U , an object o belongs to a
class O, and P is a permission.
1. Is Hill allowed to read some processed offers?
P,S |= {hill} v ∃Read.Processed? (Formula 1)
2. Is Hill allowed to read more than 5 of the processed
offers?
P,S |= {hill} v≥ 5Read.Processed? (Formula 3) Num-
ber restriction ‘≥ n’ formalizes the constraint of min-
imum n. The maximum constraint is straight forward
by ‘≤ n’. The exact constraint ‘= n’ can be formalized
with combination of maximum and minimum. Strictly
more than n and less than n can be achieved with min-
imum n+1 and maximum n-1 because in RelBAC ‘n’
is a natural number.
3. Is Hill allowed to read all the processed offers?
P,S |= {hill} v ∀Processed.Read? (Formula 5)
4. Is there any manager allowed to read all the processed
offers?
P,S |= Processed v ∃Read−.Manager? (Formula 1’)
5. Are there at least 3 managers allowed to read all the
processed offers? P,S |= Processed v≥ 3Read−.Manager?
(Formula 4’)
6. Are urgent offers allowed to be read only by managers?
P,S |= Urgent v ∀Read.Manager? (Formula 2’)
We can see from the above that flexible queries can be an-
swered by the reasoner. So complex access control requests
can be decided such as those requests with arity constraints.
4.2 Dynamic Separation of Duties
Separation of Duties (SoD) can be categorized into static
SoD and dynamic SoD. A static SoD has been discussed in
Section 3.4.1. A dynamic SoD enforces intuitively that the
duties in a SoD are allowed to be assigned to one user at
design-time, but not allowed to be activated simultaneously
at run-time.
To enforce a dynamic SoD, RelBAC introduces a new kind
of permission, run-time permission (RTP), to describe the
state of permission execution at run-time. For a PERMISSION
in form of a verb (phrase), the corresponding RTP is the
present continuous participle of the verb. For example, the
RTP of ‘read’ is ‘reading’. To support dynamic SoD, for
each PERMISSION, a RTP is introduced. Moreover, a user
cannot have an RTP unless she has the original PERMISSION.
For the example of permission ‘read’, Reading ≥ Read is
used to restrict that a user cannot execute ‘reading’ without
assignment of ‘read’. Thus the dynamic SoD ‘an offer cannot
be read and updated at the same time’ is specified as follows.
Reading u Updating v ⊥
The knowledge base must update with all active PERMIS-
SIONs. For example, ‘an agent Ann is updating an offer
trento’ should be detected by the system monitor and S
should be added a new assertion Updating(ann, trento). Then
6
the dynamic SoD will take effect that ‘no one can update
trento’ as an entailment reasoning as follows.
P,S unionsq {Reading(ann, trento)} |=
∃Updating.{trento} uManager v ⊥
If a manager requests to update the offer trento, it will be
rejected.
5. AUTOMATED REASONING
In this section, we present the architecture of a RelBAC
system and some test results of the reasoner.
As shown in Figure 5, the user interface (UI) stands between
users and the internal components: the knowledge base and
the reasoner. The knowledge base consists of two parts:
the policies P and the states S. Hollow arrows stand for
user related operation or information exchange; solid arrows
represents internal data flow and interaction.
Figure 5: Architecture of a RelBAC System
Size(kb) Set P.A. Individual Time(ms)
1 61.0 14 10 426 48.0
2 86.8 141 131 162 592.0
3 141.1 141 131 483 2191.0
4 273.4 141 131 805 5677.0
P.A.=Permission Assignment
Figure 6: Knowledge Base Consistency Test
• From the perspective of an administrator, the hollow
arrows (a) and (b) are direct queries and updates to
the knowledge base, where the solid arrow (h) repre-
sents the interaction of knowledge between P and S.
The reasoning service at design-time to perform re-
dundancy checking and conflict checking are offered to
the administrator by arrow (c), Arrow (e), (g) and (f)
stand for reasoning with P, S and both, corresponding
to standard TBox, ABox and TBox+ABox reasoning
in DL.
• From a requester point of view, a query for permission
is interpreted by the UI and handed to the reasoner
through arrow (d). The reasoner processes the query
as an entailment reasoning with respect to the knowl-
edge base through arrows (e), (f) and (g) to provide
access control decisions.
Our implementation integrates an open source reasoner Pel-
let [19] through owl-api. A series of ontologies are built
with RDF/OWL language about the scenario of the SFA
example. Sample policies in Section 2.1 are covered by
these ontologies together with randomly generated groups
and classes plus hundreds of individuals.
A small business with 5 groups, 9 classes and about 400
individuals (including employees and documents) with 10
permission assignments (P.A.) is formalized in an ontology of
61.0kb. And it takes less than 50 ms to complete consistency
checking (Record 1 of Figure 6). When the scale increases
in the number of sets (either group or class) and P.A. for
more than 10 times (as Record 2), the checking time also
increases. In the remaining three case studies the numer
of sets is increased of a factor of ten with the number of
individuals ranging from roughly half the number of case
1 (162) to roughly double this number (805). The growth
is relatively fast, as one would expect when dealing with
DL reasoning problems. The good news, however, is that
the overall times are within reason and close to real time
(from 48 ms to 5677 ms). These first preliminary results
are quite positive as we expect substantial speed ups when
using dedicated AC focused reasoning heuristics.
6. RELATEDWORK
As a well known access control model, the amount of work
done on RBAC and its level of development are incompara-
bly high (see, e.g., [8, 1, 18] or [4]). A preliminary version
of RelBAC was introduced in [11]. In that paper we in-
troduced the idea and the logic of the model but we did
not cover the reasoning ability which is the main topic of
this paper. As already hinted in the previous sections the
main difference of RelBAC with respect to RBAC is that
the former models permissions as ER relations thus making
them first class objects (which can evolve independently of
users and resources), and thus allowing for arity aware access
control policies. Furthermore the use of ER relations allows
for a direct embedding of policies into a (Description) Logic
which allows to reason about them. Yet another difference
from RBAC is the formation of hierarchies. Role hierarchies
serves as an advanced feature in RBAC but not necessarily
true for different scenarios as discussed by Li et al. in [15].
RelBAC provides a way with the partial order for permis-
sion propagation in natural formalization (in Section 3.3),
this can be also a way to formalize any binary relations that
form the hierarchy (of users, objects and even permissions)
which does not propagate permissions.
However, in our opinion, a much more interesting compari-
son between RBAC and RelBAC can be made by analyzing
their similarities rather than their differences. The key ob-
servation is that RelBAC can be seen a natural extension
of RBAC obtained exactly by adding what in the previous
paragraph were listed as the main differences, namely arities
in access control rules and the direct embedding of policies
into a logic. On top of this, our preliminary experiments,
which highlight a substantial similarity in the implementa-
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tion (of ground policies) and in the user interactions, make
us hope that in the end it will be possible to use RelBAC as
as some kind of enhanced RBAC.
A lot of work has also been developed towards providing log-
ical frameworks which would allow to reason about RBAC
based policies, see, e.g., [3, 12, 17]. Besides the differences
in the underlying logic and in the specifics of the formaliza-
tions, a conceptual difference is that all these logical frame-
works have been added on top of RBAC, while RelBAC is
defined natively with its own (Description) Logic. As a non
trivial plus of our approach, it becomes possible (with only a
bit of effort) in RelBAC to have non-logic experts to handle
policies and to reason about them using state of the art rea-
soning technologies (the SAT technology - used within DL
reasoners - is by far the most advanced technology and the
one mostly used in real world applications).
Some work has also been done in formalizing RBAC in DL.
Thus, for instance, DL was used in [21] in order to formalize
relations as binary roles while, more recently, J.Chae et al.
used DL to formalize the object hierarchy of RBAC [5]. This
work is again very different from ours as here DL is just
another logic used to reason about RBAC instead of the
logic designed to express (RelBAC ) policies.
Other researchers have dealt with the problem we are inter-
ested in. Juri et al. proposed an access control solution for
sharing semantic data across desktops [7]. They use a three
dimensional access control matrix to represent fine-grained
policies. We see a problem in that their solution does not
seem to scale well since the matrix grows polynomially with
the number of objects and of sets of users sharing such ob-
jects (as from above, RelBAC , like RBAC does not have
this problem since it uses hierarchies to represent knowl-
edge about users, objects and permissions.) Other authors
have addressed the problem of access control in open and dy-
namic environments by adapting RBAC. One such approach
is [3].
Such research has also been done to use logic for policy veri-
fication [20, 13, 9, 14]. Just to mention some examples. Us-
zok et al. used DAML (http://www.daml.org) description
logic based ontology for environments, contexts and policies
in [20]. They model actions as DAML classes as well as
subjects and objects, different from RelBAC in which per-
missions are formalized as DL roles. Organisation has been
considered as an extension of role in ORBAC [13] in which
Kalam et al. used a first-order logic based logic to formalize
the model, which models the control problem with named
triples. In contrast, we use Description Logic as the formal-
ism which is a decidable subset of first order logic. K. Fisler
et al. proposed a tool named Margrave [9] implemented with
BDD at the back end. Our solution is based on Description
Logic which is more expressive than a propositional logic.
V. Kolovski et al. used Defeasible Description Logic rules
to model the policy in [14]. However, the main difference
between these approaches and RelBAC is not much about
the reasoning abilities of one logic over another but rather
the attempt made by RelBAC to provide a solution that
allows to write access control rules using a well known nota-
tion (ER diagrams) and then translate them into DL. This
has the clear advantage of using a well known methodology
and the possibility to use a large variety of mature and well
studied tools.
Li et al. present an algebra for high-level policy about com-
plex SoD in [16]. It offers rich expressiveness for composition
of a user set so as to enforce the Such expressiveness is cov-
ered by RelBAC without any extension.
7. CONCLUSION
RelBAC models permissions as binary relations which may
evolve independently as a first class component. This allows
to express many complex properties, and especially powerful
in arity related policies. In this paper, we illustrated the ad-
vantage of RelBAC to use off-the-shelf reasoners to reason
about typical access control problems and properties. In
this first evaluation we showed that many reasoning tasks
are supported. However, state of the art reasoners are not
specifically designed for RelBAC so the time consumed is
hardly ‘real-time’. As part of the future work we will study
how to improve efficiency. We would like also to test the
reasoner against policies more complex than the one consid-
ered in this paper and possibly extend the class of security
properties we test. Another direction of the future work is
to exploit Semantic Matching [10] to support the generation
of permissions assignments based on similarity.
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